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Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The
New Extreme Hardship in Cancellation of
Deportation Cases
WILLIAM C.B. UNDERWOOD*
INTRODUCTION
After exploding onto the national political scene in 1994, immigration reform
became a cornerstone of the legislative agenda on Capitol Hill.' Following nearly
two years of acrimonious debate, Congress passed much heralded "landmark"
immigration reform legislation. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA")3 aimed to address the public backlash
against America's growing population of illegal residents.4 The sweeping
overhaul provides several popular measures which increase border patrol officers
and investigative personnel, increase penalties for alien smuggling and document
fraud, and improve the verification system for employment. However, "under the
popular cover of fighting illegal immigration, Congress [also made] radical
changes in the procedures of immigration law[,] cutting back long-established
rules that limit abuse and unfairness on the part of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service [('INS')]." 5
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.B.A., 1994,
Arizona State University; B.S., 1991, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Special thanks to
Professor William D. Popkin for his constructive comments on earlier drafts of this Note;
Professor John A. Scanlan for this Note's topic and for his guidance and helpful editing; and
to my wife, Melissa, for her love, support, and patience throughout my work.
1. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Senate Approves Broad Assault on Illegal Immigration, L.A.
TIMES, May 3, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 5265796 ("It was California's Proposition
187, the 1994 initiative seeking to bar illegal immigrants from a variety of public services, that
catapulted immigration onto the national stage."). Inspired by California's Proposition 187,
several movements emerged across the country to implement similar policies. See, e.g., Maria
Puente, States Setting Stage for Their Own Prop. 187, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 1994, at 3A,
available in 1994 WL 11073994.
2. On September 30, 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of Sept. 30, 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, as part of a large appropriations bill put together hastily
before adjournment and signed shortly thereafter by President Clinton. "This bill ... includes
landmark immigration reform legislation that reinforces the efforts we have made over the last
three years to combat illegal immigration." President Clinton's Statement on Signing
Appropriations Bill, U.S. Newswire, Oct. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires
File.
3. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570.
4. See William Branigin, Congress Finishes Major Legislation, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1996,
at Al, available in 1996 WL 12722570.
5. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Mean and Petty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A3 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File. "Public discussion of the new [procedural
changes] ha[d] been somewhat muted, as debate ha[d] focused on provisions such as the law's
doubling of U.S. Border Patrol forces and a proposal, which was withdrawn under threat of a
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Clearly, the INS has a formidable task in enforcing the civil and criminal
provisions of our immigration laws.6 We expect both effective enforcement and
a system that provides for fair, impartial, and reasoned application of the law to
individuals. Maintaining the integrity of the system is inherently problematic as
the INS is responsible not only for enforcement, but also has a service role in
providing statutorily eligible aliens7 with various benefits.8 Due to this dual
obligation, the INS must often make decisions which affect the balance between
the needs of immigration law enforcement and the compelling human needs of
an alien.' Such difficult decisions frequently occur in cases involving an alien's
request for discretionary relief from deportation.'0
The Supreme Court has described deportation as "'a drastic measure and at
times the equivalent of banishment or exile."'.. Courts regularly quote Justice
Louis Brandeis's words that deportation may deprive an individual "of all that
makes life worth living."' 2 Although courts characterize deportation proceedings
as civil in nature, 3 they have recognized the penal consequences for those
White House veto, to allow states to deny public education to illegal immigrant youngsters."
Patrick J. McDonnell, New Law Could End Immigrants'Amnesty Hopes, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 9,
1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 12744121.
6. The Attorney General delegates responsibility to the INS and other officers and
employees of the Department of Justice to administer the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994). See INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1994); 8 C.F.R. §§
2.1, 100.2 (1996).
7. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States." INA
§ 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1994).
8. As Harwood explains:
[The INS's service functions] range from such simple clerical operations as
helping an alien file a benefit application to the adjudication of more than 30
different kinds of benefit requests. Benefit adjudications include the issuance of
travel documents and re-entry permits to authorized aliens and the replacement
of lost or stolen alien registration receipts (the 1-551 green cards) along with such
important immigration benefits as the grant of lawful permanent residence
(immigrant visas) and naturalization (U.S. citizenship).
EDWIN HARWOOD, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND IMMIGRATION LAW
ENFORCEMENT 26 (1986).
9. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 652 (1995).
10. "Deportation ... is the removal of an alien who has entered in the United States-either
legally or illegally." Id. at 511.
11. Sana Loue, What Went Wrong With Wang?: An Examination of Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Wang, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 59, 59 (1982) (citing Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)); see also Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963)
("[D]eportation is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families .... ").
12. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 9, at 685.
13. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893):
The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not banishment, in
the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his
country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his
own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the
performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its
constitutional authority and through the proper departments, has determined that
his continuing to reside here shall depend.
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affected. 4 In recognition of the harsh results that deportation might impose on
certain long-term resident aliens, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") 5
allowed for the discretionary cancellation of an alien's deportation in cases
where it would be an extreme hardship for the alien to leave the United States. 6
Despite the enormous discretion vested in agency decisionmakers" and the
erosion of meaningful review,"3 Congress has drastically curtailed this relief and
eliminated a fundamental procedural safeguard by categorically prohibiting
judicial review.' 9 Thus, it appears that Congress has completely insulated
potentially abusive and unconscionable decisions.
With the alien's fate at the mercy of the agency's discretion, the necessity of
ensuring the fair, impartial, and reasoned exercise of this discretion would seem
crucial. However, the discretionary relief afforded by Congress's newly-
constructed "cancellation of removal" provision" continues to provide no
meaningful guidance for its administration. The agency's failure to develop
internal guidelines for the exercise of its discretion has preserved the status quo
and thus decisional disparity remains inevitable. Worse yet, Congress's
prohibition ofjudicial review removes an essential final measure of control over
the agency's discretionary decisionmaking. The unfortunate result is potentially
arbitrary and unjust decisions with essentially no possibility of correction. With
so much at stake for the individual, should we tolerate such a result?
This Note examines the new cancellation of removal provision and offers some
perspectives on its legitimacy by focusing on the unguided and unrestrained
discretion vested in the Attorney General and her subordinates in its
administration.2' By revealing the unlimited potential for unjust decisionmaking,
this Note demonstrates the need for effective guidance and restraint. Part I
presents an overview of the history, process, and statutory eligibility
14. See, e.g., Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Deportation is not, of
course, a penal sanction. But in severity it surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal
penalties.").
15. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1255 (1994).
16. See INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, §§ 308(b)(7), 309, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1680, 1697-1701.
17. See part II.
18. See part III.
19. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(a)(2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009)
1570, 1666-67 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)).
20. IIRIRA, Pub. L.No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (I10 Stat. 3009) 1570,
1633-44 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). "Cancellation of removal" under INA § 240A
was formally referred to as "suspension of deportation" as derived from an earlier form of the
provision which authorized the Attorney General to "suspend" deportation in certain cases
upon a showing of "serious economic detriment" to an immediate relative of a deportable alien.
The matter was then reported to Congress, which could disallow the suspension and mandate
deportation. As the statute no longer requires congressional participation, and apparently
Congress's desire to soften the deportation language, the relief is now termed "cancellation of
removal" to reflect the Attorney General's authority to cancel, not merely suspend, "removal"
proceedings. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 9, at 653.
21. This Note will focus discussion on the former "suspension of deportation" relief
components of the new cancellation of removal provision and will refer to the relief as
"cancellation of deportation."
.8871997]
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requirements for cancellation of deportation relief. Part II investigates the
cancellation of deportation decision and reveals the unfettered discretion vested
in immigration decisionmakers. Part III reviews the erosion, and Congress's
subsequent elimination, of judicial review. Finally, Part IV offers proposals to
help achieve better cancellation of deportation decisionmaking and urges
Congress to clarify and correct its ill-advised reconstruction of the law.
I. CANCELLATION OF DEPORTATION: AN OVERVIEW
For the estimated five million illegal immigrants in the United States,22
cancellation of deportation is one of the few avenues available to become a
lawful permanent resident.23 Obviously, most deportable aliens would desire to
remain in the United States in a lawful status. Relief from deportation therefore
must strike a balance between government interests in enforcing immigration
laws and concern for the individual circumstances of the alien. 4 Long-
established discretionary relief served to strike that balance by allowing
cancellation of deportation only in circumstances where deportation would visit
an unbefitting degree of hardship upon long-term residents.25 Yet, the critical
definition of the particular circumstances which fall within that contemplated
degree of hardship, and merit such relief, has remained elusive.
A. Cancellation of Deportation Relief. A Historical
Perspective
Prior to 1940, our immigration laws inflexibly demanded the deportation of an
alien living illegally in the United States. 6 However, the accumulation of
22. See, e.g., William Branigin, 5 Million Reside Illegally in U.S., INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb.
8, 1997, at Al.
23. "The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been
lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant
in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(20) (1994).
After admission, immigrants are... often referred to as lawful permanent
residents (LPRs) or permanent resident aliens, until they obtain citizenship
through naturalization. Permanent resident status means quite simply that [such
individuals] may stay as long as they wish (provided they do not engage in certain
post-entry activities that render them deportable) .... One may remain in LPR
status indefinitely.
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 9, at 122 n.1.
24. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 9, at 652.
25. See INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, §§ 308(b)(7), 309, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1680, 1697-1701.
26. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 933 (1983):
The Immigration Act of 1924, [Pub. L. No. 139, 43 Stat. 153] required the
Secretary of Labor to deport any alien who entered or remained in the United
States unlawfully. The only means by which a deportable alien could lawfully
remain in the United States was to have his status altered by a private bill enacted
by both Houses and presented to the President pursuant to the procedures set out
in Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution.
[Vol. 72:885
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hardships produced by this unyielding law "led to urgent proposals for
amelioration."27 In the Alien Registration Act of 1940, Congress responded by
amending section 19 of the 1917 Immigration Ace8 to allow the Attorney General
to suspend an alien's deportation if he could prove five years of residence in the
United States with good moral character, and that deportation would result in
serious economic detriment to a spouse, parent, or minor child who was a United
States citizen or a lawfully permanent resident.29 Furthermore, a 1948 amendment
extended the availability of the suspension process to those aliens without family
ties who could establish seven years of residence in the United States.3"
In the early 1950s, critics claimed that aliens were abusing the suspension of
deportation process and "that illegal entrants were being favored excessively."'"
In 1952, Congress responded by restricting eligibility for suspension of
deportation.32 Congress concluded that the "serious economic detriment"
standard was too generous and thus authorized suspension of deportation only
where it would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien
or to his spouse, parent or child, who is a citizen or alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence."33 Congress intended that such relief be granted only in
those circumstances where an alien's deportation would be unconscionable. 4
In addition to the "exceptional and extremely unusual"" hardship standard,
Congress further restricted eligibility for suspension of deportation relief by
requiring an alien to show "good moral character" and a certain continuous
27.3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 74.07[2][a] (1988
& Supp. Aug. 1996) ("Confronted with large numbers of compassionate cases, the
administrative authorities requested that Congress grant authority to remit deportation."). "In
1936 the Commissioner of Immigration cited nearly 3,000 cases under consideration which
involved 'such incredibly cruel family separations ... so repugnant to every American
principle ofjustice and humanity that deportation was stayed until Congress might take some
action."' Susan L. Kamlet, Comment, Judicial Review of "Extreme Hardship" in Suspension
of Deportation Cases, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 175, 175 n.4 (1984).
28. Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
29. See Pub. L. No. 76-670, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 672 (1940).
30. See Act of July 1, 1948, 62 Stat. 1206.
31. 3 GORDON, supra note 27, § 74.07[2][b]; see S. REP. No. 82-1137, at 25 (1952)
(claiming that suspension of deportation was used to bypass conventional immigration
channels); S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 600-01 (1950) (arguing that since each cancellation of
deportation reduces the number of visas available by one, it is therefore unfair for those aliens
waiting to immigrate through conventional means).
32. See Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 163, 214.
33. Id; 3 GORDON, supra note 27, § 74.07[5][f].
34. See S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 25 (1952):
[U]nder the bill, to justify the suspension of deportation the hardship must not
only be unusual but must also be exceptionally and extremely unusual. The bill
accordingly establishes a policy that the administrative remedy should be
available only in the very limited category of cases in which the deportation of the
alien would be unconscionable.
35. Congress adopted the stricter "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship standard
over the "extreme and unusual" hardship standard recommended by the Senate Subcommittee
on the Judiciary. S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 610 (1950).
1997]
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period of residency depending on the seriousness of the deportation grounds.36
Thus, Congress imposed stricter eligibility requirements on more serious
violators of the immigration laws. However, the new hardship standard applied
to all of the deportation grounds."
Under this new "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship standard the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")38 identified the following basic factors
it would consider in determining whether or not to grant relief: (1) length of
residence in the United States, including the manner of entry; (2) family ties; (3)
possibility of obtaining a visa abroad; (4) financial burden on the alien of having
to go abroad to obtain a visa; and (5) health and age of the alien.39 Although an
alien need not present a favorable showing upon all of the factors, an alien
should at least present a favorable showing of several of these factors to establish
the necessary hardship.4"
In 1962, amongst severe criticism of the "exceptional and extremely unusual"
hardship standard,4' Congress again revised the hardship standard by dividing the
suspension of deportation provision into two categories. 42 For those aliens found
36. See Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 163, 214.
37. See id.
38. The BIA is the appellate review body for appeals from the immigration courts. See part
I.B. (discussing the BIA's role in cancellation of deportation proceedings).
39. See In re S., 5 I. & N. Dec. 409, 410-11 (1953).
40. See id. at 410.
41. See Jonathon P. Foerstel, Comment, Suspension of Deportation-Toward a New
Hardship Standard, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 663, 667 n.31 (1981).
Both President Truman and President Eisenhower were critical of the new
hardship standard. President Truman, in his veto of the Act of 1952, expressed
fear that section 244 "would narrow the circle of those who can obtain relief...
." This, he felt, would be unfortunate since other sections of the Act of 1952
would impose harsher restrictions and add to the number deserving relief. H.R.
Doc. No. 520, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952). In a letter to Senator Arthur Watkins,
President Eisenhower stated that there would be problems interpreting the
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard, and therefore, "the laws
should more clearly state the standards upon which this discretionary relief may
be granted by the Attorney General." 99 CONG. REC. 4321 (1953).
Id. (alteration in original). One of the harshest criticisms of the "exceptional and extremely
unusual" hardship standard came from Ben Touster, President of the Hebrew Sheltering and
Immigration Aid Society:
[S]ection 244 [along with §§ 212(c), 245] ... rob our immigration laws of every
vestige of humaneness which has developed since 1917. The hardship attendant
upon separating families is not enough to grant suspension.... One must measure
degrees of suffering and torture, and only those who suffer the anxiety of mental
and physical pain to the utmost may be relieved under this law. The rest must
suffer exile, a dreadful punishment abandoned by the common consent of all
civilized peoples.
Id. at 668 n.34 (quoting STAFF OF PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION, 82D. CONG., HEARINGS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 1789 (Comm. Print 1952)) (alterations in original).
42. See Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247; 3 GORDON, supra
note 27, § 74.07[5][f].
[Vol. 72:885
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deportable on less serious grounds,43 Congress changed the standard from
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to "extreme hardship" under INA
section 244(a)(1). For more serious violators,4 Congress retained the
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard under section 244(a)(2).
Although its reasons for the amendment were not explained,45 the distinction
between these two provisions indicates that Congress intended to lower the
hardship standard for those found deportable on less serious grounds.
46
43. Under former INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, §§ 304(b)(7), 309, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1680, 1697-1701,
there were two different hardship standards based on the seriousness of deportation grounds.
Section 244(a)(1) required a showing of "extreme hardship" for an alien deportable on any
other grounds except those specified in § 244(a)(2). Section 244(a)(3) also required a showing
of "extreme hardship" for those aliens found deportable on any grounds except those specified
in § 244(a)(2) and § 241(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(G) (1994) (found to have engaged
in marriage fraud). Section 244(a)(2) required a showing of "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" for aliens found deportable on the following grounds: INA §
241 (a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude); INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (convicted of an aggravated
felony); INA § 241(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (convicted of a violation of any law
or regulation relating to a controlled substance); INA § 241(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) (found to be a drug abuser or addict); INA § 241(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(2)(C) (convicted of certain firearm offenses); INA § 241(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(2)(D)(i) (convicted of an offense relating to espionage, sabotage, or treason and
sedition); INA § 241(a)(2)(D)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(D)(ii) (convicted of threatening the
President, successors to the Presidency, and friendly nations); INA § 241(a)(2)(D)(iii), 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(D)(iii) (convicted of violating any provision of the Military Selective
Service Act (50 U.S.C. App. § 451-472) or Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. §§
1-6, 7-39, 41-44)); INA § 241(a)(2)(D)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(D)(iv) (convicted of
violating laws relating to the departure or entry of persons in the United States and importing
aliens for an immoral purpose); INA § 241(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3)(A) (failure to notify
Attorney General of change of address); INA § 241(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3)(B)
(convicted of failing to register or falsification of documents); INA § 241(a)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 125 1(a)(3)(C) (found violating laws relating to document fraud); INA § 241(a)(4)(A)(i), 8
U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(4)(A)(i) (found violating or evading any law prohibiting the export of goods,
technology, or sensitive information); INA § 241(a)(4)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(A)(ii)
(found engaging in criminal activity which endangers public safety or national security); INA
§ 241 (a)(4)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(4)(A)(iii) (found engaging in any activity relating to
the control or overthrow of the Government of the United States); INA § 241(a)(3)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (found engaging in terrorist activities); INA § 241(a)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C.
-§ 1251(a)(4)(C) (found presence or activities to have potentially serious foreign policy
consequences); or INA § 241(a)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(D) (found assisting in Nazi
persecution or genocide).
44. See supra note 43 (discussing the more serious grounds for deportation).
45. The bill was merely described as one "to facilitate the entry of alien skilled specialists
and certain relatives of U.S. citizens, and for other purposes." H.R. REP. No. 87-2552, at 1
(1962).
46. See Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1345 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 139 (1981)
("The distinction between these requirements has not been clearly defined, but it is generally
agreed that Congress intended to lessen the degree of hardship required for suspension of
deportation."); In re Hwang, 10 I. & N. Dec. 448, 452 (1964); In re Louie, 10 I. & N. Dec.
223, 225 (1963); 3 GORDoN, supra note 27, § 74.07[5][f].
1997]
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Prior to 1952, the Attorney General needed to report the decision to suspend
deportation to Congress, which could override the decision by passing a
concurrent resolution mandating deportation.47 If Congress failed to do so, the
Attorney General canceled deportation proceedings and adjusted the alien's
status to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States. However,
Congress thereafter amended the statute to require a resolution by only a single
House of Congress to disallow an alien's cancellation of deportation.4 In the
landmark case of INS v. Chadha,49 the Supreme Court declared the one-house
veto provision unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the mandatory reporting procedure
remained. Thus, all grants of suspension required a detailed statement of facts
and reasons to be sent to Congress for review. In 1988, Congress amended the
statute to delete its participation in cancellation of deportation decisions and
allow the grants of cancellation to take effect upon final approval of an
immigration judge or the BIA. 0 Still, the relief under INA section 244(a)
remained termed "suspension of deportation" even though the decision in fact
"canceled," not merely "suspended," an alien's deportation.
Congress made no substantial changes to the relief provision until 1994.51 The
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 19942 added paragraph (3)
to INA section 244(a). Section 244(a)(3) created a third category which allowed
the Attorney General to cancel the deportation of three groups of aliens subject
to abuse: "(1) aliens who were battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by their
U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouses; (2) aliens who were battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty by their U.S. citizen or permanent resident parent(s);
and (3) aliens whose children were battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by
their U.S. citizen or permanent resident parent(s)." 3 Congress lowered the
eligibility requirements by requiring a showing of only three years of continuous
residency and good moral character and thereby expanded the availability of
relief for abused spouses and children whose deportation would result in extreme
hardship. 4
Under the popular guise of restricting illegal immigration, Congress radically
reconstructed the suspension of deportation provision two years later. The
47. See Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
933-34 (1983) (discussing the history of Congress's participation in cancellation of deportation
proceedings).
48. See Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(b), 66 Stat. 163, 215.
49. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
50. See Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-525, § 2(q), 102
Stat. 2609, 2613 (amending INA § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)).
51. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 602, 104 Stat. 4978, 5077, and
the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-232, § 307(h), (k), 105 Stat. 1733, 1755-56, reorganized and redesignated the
grounds for deportation. Only minor corresponding amendments were made to INA section
244(a) to account for these changes.
52. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40703(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1955.
53. 3 GoRDON, supra note 27, § 74.07[1 1]; see INA § 244(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3),
amended by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009)
1570, 1645-46 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)).
54. See supra note 53.
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IIRIRA55 consolidated waiver of deportation relief under INA section 212(c) 6
and suspension of deportation relief under section 24417 into one provision
termed "cancellation of removal" under section 240A.58 However, after
Congress's rabid reconstruction, little remains of former suspension of
deportation relief. Current section 240A(b)(1) and (2) replaced the three forms
of relief previously available under section 244(a). Although section 240A(b)(2)
basically restates the provisions under former section 244(a)(3), section
240A(b)(1) severely circumscribes the relief formerly available under section
244(a)(1) and eliminates altogether relief previously available under section
244(a)(2). Congress essentially transplanted the stricter required showing of
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" and the ten year period of
continuous'physical presence and good moral character requirements from prior
section 244(a)(2) to its newly-fashioned section 240A(b)(1). In addition,
Congress further restricted availability of relief under section 240A(b)(1) and (2)
by limiting the number of adjustments to lawful permanent resident status to
4,000 in any fiscal year. 9
Congress's most radical change, however, was the prohibition of judicial
review. INA section 242(a)(2)(B) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any judgment
regarding the grant of relief under section . . . 240A."60 Proponents of the
measure cited frustrations with aliens using litigation as a means to prolong their
stays and potentially gain legal resident status.6 ' However, despite a 1991
Attorney General report concluding that aliens were not engaging in such
exploitation,62 Congress also placed additional procedural restrictions limiting
55. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570.
56. Congress made this type of discretionary relief available to lawful permanent resident
aliens who became deportable as a result of certain criminal offenses or other conduct which
would make them inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, §§ 304(b), 309, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1650, 1697-1701;
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (concluding that aliens who had never departed
from the United States were also eligible for INA § 212(c) relief).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 308(b)(7),
309, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (I10 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1680, 1697-1701.
58. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570,
1644-48 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b).
59. See id. at 1646, 1648 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(3), (e)).
60. Id. § 306(a)(2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1667 (to be codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)).
61. As the House Report indicates:
Suspension of deportation is often abused by aliens seeking to delay
proceedings until 7 years have accrued. This includes aliens who failed to appear
for their deportation proceedings and were ordered deported in absentia, and then
seek to re-open proceedings once the requisite time has passed. Such tactics are
possible because some Federal courts permit aliens to continue to accrue time
toward the seven year threshold even after they have been placed in deportation
proceedings.
H.R. REP. No. 104-469 (pt. 1), at 122 (1996); see, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 5.
62. See 68 INTEPPRETER RELEASES 907 (1991); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 9, at 659
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an alien's ability to reopen and reconsider deportation proceedings. 3
Presumably, these new restrictions would relax concerns about potential abuse
of the appeals process to forestall deportation. ' Nevertheless, Congress thought
it necessary to strip the courts of jurisdiction to review these decisions, thereby
leaving the final word to the INS-an agency with a history of abuse. 5
By severely circumscribing cancellation of deportation relief and eliminating
judicial review, Congress grossly shifted the balance between enforcement and
humanitarian concerns. Given Congress's overcorrection, many of the most
deserving aliens simply will not be able to meet the stringent new eligibility
requirements. Moreover, those few aliens with a colorable claim to relief have
no real assurances of a fair and accurate determination. As this Note will
63. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009)
1570, 1643, (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(5)); 61 Fed. Reg. 18,904, 18,905, 32,924
(1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2) (allowing an alien to file only one motion to
reconsider a decision that the alien is deportable and requiring the motion to be filed within
thirty days of a final order of removal); IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1643 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(6)) (allowing
an alien to file only one motion to reopen proceedings and requiring the motion to be filed
within 90 days of a final order of removal). A motion to reopen, if granted, allows an alien to
present new evidence that was "not available and could not have been discovered or presented
at the former hearing." 61 Fed. Reg. 18,904, 32,924 (1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2).
On the other hand, a motion to reconsider, if granted, allows review of errors of law or fact in
the previous order. See id.; 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5, 242.22 (1996); ALIENIKOFF, supra note 9, at
658; see also part I.B (discussing the cancellation of deportation process).
64. Obviously, the longer an alien lives in the United States, the greater the potential for
hardship upon deportation. In addition, an alien may not have resided in the United States long
enough to meet the required residency period to establish eligibility for relief prior to
deportation proceedings. Thus, an alien has incentives to file motions to reopen proceedings
whereby the alien has additional time to establish the residency requirement or possibly new
grounds for the requisite degree of hardship under INA section 240A(b). See ALENKOFF,
supra note 9, at 657-58. However, filing a motion to reopen does not automatically stay the
execution of an outstanding order of removal. The decision whether to grant a stay, as well as
the pending motion, is left to the discretion of the immigration decisionmaker. See 61 Fed. Reg.
18,904, 18,905, 32,924 (1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.22, 243.4
(1996). Furthermore, for cancellation of removal determinations, section 240A(d)(1) ends the
alien's period of residency when the alien is served notice to appear in the initial deportation
proceedings. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.
3009) 1570, 1647 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)). In addition, section 240(c)(6)
requires an alien to submit a motion to reopen proceedings within ninety days of a final order
of removal. Id. at 164 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(6)). Therefore, little opportunity
remains for an alien to use such dilatory tactics.
65. See, e.g., Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 146 (1991) ("Evidence indicates that the INS
has engaged in abusive litigation tactics.") (Blackmun J., dissenting). "[C]ritics point to a
history of abuses by the [INS]-abuses they say have been directed not only at illegal
immigrants but also at legal immigrants and even U.S. citizens, some of whom have been
wrongly detained and even expelled because of their appearance or accents." McDonnell, supra
note 5. Lucal Gettentag, Director of the National Immigration Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union, stated that "It]he history of the agency over the last 15 years demonstrates
repeated and systemic violations of the law and the Constitution." Louis Freedberg,
Government Limiting Ability of Immigrants to Fight INS, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 22, 1996, at 3,
available in 1996 WL 11571448.
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illustrate, Congress has unnecessarily tipped the balance too far toward
enforcement objectives.
B. The Cancellation of Deportation Process
Generally, the cancellation of deportation process begins with a deportable
alien's application for cancellation to the immigration judge in a deportation
proceeding.66 An alien bears the burden of proving statutory eligibility and the
basis on which the alien requests a favorable exercise of discretion.67 If the
immigration judge finds that the alien meets the eligibility requirements of INA
section 240A(b),68 the judge may, in her discretion, cancel deportation. 9 If the
immigration judge denies the application, the alien may appeal the decision to the
BIA.7" A BIA denial, however, is no longer reviewable by the courts.7'
After a BIA denial, an alien may file one motion to reconsider the decision.72
Such motion must be filed within thirty days of the prior decision and must
specify errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority. 7 An alien
may not, however, seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion
to reconsider.74
If an alien's circumstances change following deportation proceedings, the alien
has one opportunity to reopen proceedings.75 An alien addresses the motion to the
immigration judge unless the alien has already appealed the decision to the BIA
in which case the alien must then address the motion directly to the BIA.76 These
motions "shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board [or immigration
judge] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and
66. See 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (1996). A deportation proceeding is an administrative hearing
conducted by an immigration judge called a "special inquiry officer." Such an officer is an
attorney appointed by the Attorney General. See INA § 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(4)
(1994).
67. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(e) (1996); 3 GORDON, supra note 27, § 74.07[2][e].
68. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570,
164446 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)).
69. See id.
70. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1996) (regulating authority and powers of the BIA); 61 Fed. Reg.
18,909, 21,065 (1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.21) (authorizing appeals).
71. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(a)(2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009)
1570, 1667 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)). Previously, an alien could seek
judicial review by filing a petition with a United States court of appeals within 90 days from
the date of the BIA decision. See INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1994), repealed by
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1675; 6
GORDON, supra note 27, § 143.06[3].
72. See 61 Fed. Reg. 18,904, 18,905, 32,924 (1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2); 8
CF.R. § 242.22 (1996).
73. See 61 Fed. Reg. 18,904, 18,905, 32,924 (1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2).
74. See id,
75. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1996); supra note 63 (discussing motions to reopen and
reconsider).
76. See 61 Fed. Reg. 18,904, 18,905 (1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2); 8 C.F.R. §
242.22 (1996).
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could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing ....
Furthermore, "[s]uch motions will not be granted 'when a primafaeie case of
eligibility for the relief sought has not been established."' 7 8 However, even if an
alien establishes a prima facie showing of these requirements, the alien's motion
may still be denied.79 Decisions denying motions to reopen and reconsider are
also no longer subject to judicial review."
C. Statutory Eligibility Requirements
77. 61 Fed. Reg. 18,904, 18,905 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2); see also 8 C.F.R. §
242.22 (1996).
78. INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 141 (1981) (quoting In re Lam, 14 1. & N. Dec. 98 (1972))
(emphasis in original).
79. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (affirming that Attorney General has
broad discretion to grant or deny such motions); INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985)
(holding that refusal to reopen suspension proceedings was within the Attorney General's
discretion).
80. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(a)(2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009)
1570, 1667 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)). Formerly, under INA § 106(a), 8
U.S.C § l105a(a)(2) (1994), repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1675, the federal courts of appeals had exclusive
jurisdiction to review all final orders of deportation pursuant to administrative proceedings. See
Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 232 (1963) (holding that suspension of deportation denials were
subject to review in the federal courts of appeals).
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Cancellation of removal relief under INA section 240A8" comes in three forms,
81. The IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009)
1570, 1644-48 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b) provides in part:
(a) CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL FOR CERTAIN PERMANENT
RESIDENTS.-The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien
who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien-
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less
than 5 years,
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been
admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
(b) CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR
CERTAIN NONPERMANENT RESIDENTS.-
(1) In general.-The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien-
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such
application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2),
237(a)(2), or 237(a)(3); and
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.
(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR BATTERED SPOUSE OR CHILD.-The
Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien demonstrates
that-
(A) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the
United States by a spouse or parent who is a United States citizen or
lawful permanent resident (or is the parent of a child of a United States
citizen or lawful permanent resident and the child has been battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States by such citizen or
permanent resident parent);
(B) the alien has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than 3 years immediately preceding the date
of such application;
(C) the alien has been a person of good moral character during such
period;
(D) the alien is not admissible under paragraph (2) or (3) of section
212(a), is not deportable under paragraph (1)(G) or (2) through (4) of
section 237(a), and has not been convicted of an aggravated felony; and
(E) the removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien, the alien's
child, or (in the case of an alien who is a child) to the alien's parent.
In acting on applications under this paragraph, the Attorney General shall
consider any credible evidence relevant to the application. The determination of
what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within
sole discretion of the Attorney General.
(3) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.-The Attorney General may adjust to the
status of an alien lawfilly admitted for permanent residence any alien who the
Attorney General determines meets the requirements of paragraph (1) or (2).
1997]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
depending on the underlying ground of deportability and circumstances of the
alien. Section 240A(a)82 is relief formerly known as waiver of deportation."
Under section 240A(a), certain permanent resident aliens are eligible for
cancellation of deportation if they can establish that they: (1) have been an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than five years; (2) have
resided continuously in the United States for not less than seven years after being
admitted in any status; and (3) have not been convicted of any aggravated
felony.8
4
For certain nonpermanent resident aliens, relief is available under section
240A(b). Section 240A(b)(1) is the general relief provision and section
240A(b)(2) is a special provision for battered spouses and children. Under both
forms an alien must show: (1) a certain continuous period of physical presence
in the United States immediately preceding the date of application; (2) that
during all of such period the alien was and is a person of good moral character;
and (3) that the alien is a person whose deportation would result in a requisite
degree of hardship to the alien or to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is
a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence."5 The residency, character, and hardship requirements vary between
the forms.
Under section 240A(b)(1), an alien must show good moral character and
physical presence in the United States for a period of at least ten years preceding
the application for relief. In addition, the alien must show that deportation would
result in "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship. Eligibility requirements
are less stringent under section 240A(b)(2) as the alien must show that
deportation would result in "extreme" hardship and establish only three years
continuous physical presence and good moral character. Under all forms, certain
circumstances may deem an alien ineligible for cancellation of removal relief.86
The number of adjustments under this paragraph shall not exceed 4,000 for
any fiscal year. The Attorney General shall record the alien's lawful
admission for permanent residence as of the date the Attorney General's
cancellation of removal under paragraph (1) or (2) or determination under this
paragraph.
82. Id. (to be codified at 1229b(a)).
83. See supra note 56 (discussing former waiver of deportation relief under INA section
212(c)).
84. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009)
1570, 1644 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)).
85. See id. at 1644-46 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) and § 1229b(b)(2)).
86. INA section 240A(c) provides that the provisions of section 240A(a) and (b)(1) shall
not apply to any of the following aliens:
(I) An alien who entered the United States as a crewman subsequent to
June 30, 1964.
(2) An alien who was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant
exchange alien as defined in section 101(a)(15)(J), or has acquired the
status of such a nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission, in order to
receive graduate medical education or training, regardless of whether or
not the alien is subject to or has fulfilled the two-year foreign residence
requirement of section 212(e).
(3) An alien who-
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The first and second statutory eligibility requirements for the two forms of
relief under section 240(b) are fairly explicit. Congress defines the ambiguous
"good moral character" requirement in the negative by reference to certain
conduct which precludes such a finding. 7 Although courts once literally
(A) was admitted to the United States as a non immigrant exchange
alien as defined in section 101(a)(15)(J) or has acquired the status of
such a nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission other than to
receive graduate medical education or training,
(B) is subject to the two-year foreign residence requirement of
section 212(e), and
(C) has not fulfilled that requirement or received a waiver thereof.
(4) An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) or deportable
under section 237(a)(4).
(5) An alien who is described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i).
(6) An alien whose removal has previously been canceled under this
section or whose deportation was suspended under section 244(a) or who
has been granted relief under section 212(c), as such sections were in
effect before the date of the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
Id at 1646-47 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)). In addition, cancellation of deportation
relief under section 240A(b)(1) is not available for an alien convicted of an offense under
section 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994), section 237(a)(2) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)) (criminal offenses involving moral turpitude; crimes with sentences of one year
or longer, aggravated felonies; crimes relating to controlled substances; firearm offenses; and
crimes involving domestic violence), or section 237(a)(3) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(3)) (failing to register and falsification of documents). Id. at 1644-45 (to be codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C)). Under section 240A(b)(1), relief is unavailable if the alien is
inadmissible under section 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994) (criminal and related
grounds) or section 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(3) (security and related grounds); deportable
under section 237(a)(1)(G) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)) (marriage fraud) or
section 237(a)(2) through (4)) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) through (4) (criminal
offenses involving moral turpitude; crimes with sentences of one year or longer; aggravated
felonies; crimes relating to controlled substances; firearm offenses; crimes involving domestic
violence; failing to register and falsification of documents; and security and related grounds);
or has been convicted of an aggravated felony (as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1 01(a)(43) (1994)).
Id. at 1645 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(D)). In 1994, Congress substantially
expanded the definition and the list of actions which constitute an "aggravated felony." See
Immigration and Naturalization Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, §
222(a), 108 Stat. 4305.
87. According to the statute:
No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character
who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be
established, is, or was-
(1) a habitual drunkard;
(2) Repealed. Pub. L. 97-116, § 2(c)(1), Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat. 1611
(3) a member of one or more of the classes of persons, whether excludable or
not, described in paragraphs (2)(D), (6)(E), and (9)(A) of section 1182(a) of this
title; or subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 1182(a)(2) of this title and
subparagraph (C) thereof of such section (except as such paragraph relates to a
single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marihuana), if the
offense described therein, for which such person was convicted or of which he
admits the commission, was committed during such period;
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interpreted the continuous physical presence requirement, 8 Congress clarified
the meaning by amendmentf9 to allow for "brief, casual, and innocent" absences
from the United States.9" However, the IIRIRA9' placed new restrictions on the
treatment of such absences. If an alien has departed from the United States for
any period in excess of ninety days or any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180
days, the alien will fail to establish the required continuous physical presence.92
The required hardship showing is an almost insurmountable barrier to
obtaining cancellation of deportation relief.93 Congress has never defined the
ambiguous "extreme" and "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship
standards. In 1953, the BIA did identify basic considerations it would consider
in determining "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship standard.94
However, the BIA failed to similarly identify basic considerations for the
"extreme" hardship standard for more than thirty years.95 During this time, "the
extreme hardship standard remain[ed] the most nebulous and controversial of the
necessary conditions of eligibility for cancellation of deportation." '96
(4) one whose income is derived principally from illegal gambling activities;
(5) one who has been convicted of two or more gambling offenses committed
during such period;
(6) one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits
under this chapter;
(7) one who during such period has been confined, as a result of conviction, to
a penal institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and eighty days or
more, regardless of whether the offense, or offenses, for which he has been
confined were committed within or without such period;
(8) one who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony (as defined
in subsection (a)(43) of this section).
The fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not
preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral
character.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1994). The purpose of this definition was to promote uniformity in
interpretation. See Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that adultery within
Immigration and Nationality Act was not defined by the law of the forum state, but by a
consistent federal interpretation which included a tendency to destroy the existing marriage);
S. REP.No. 82-1137, at 6 (1952).
88. See, e.g., INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984) (adhering to the plain meaning of
continuous physical presence requirement); Sanchez-Dominguez v. INS, 780 F.2d 1203 (5th
Cir. 1986) (denying suspension of deportation relief to two otherwise eligible aliens who
resided continuously in the United States for twelve years except for a one night stay in
Mexico).
89. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, § 315(b), 8 U.S.C. 1254(b)(2) (1994).
90. Id.; see 3 GORDON, supra note 27, § 74.0715][c].
91. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570.
92. See id § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 2647 (to be codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2)).
93. See Foerstel, supra note 41, at 664.
94. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
95. Not until In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 882 (1994), did the BIA affirmatively
enumerate factors in a published decision relevant to the determination of "extreme" hardship.
96. Kamlet, supra note 27, at 180.
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Establishing "extreme" hardship was particularly problematic due to the lack
of any clear distinction between the two hardship standards. Many courts failed
to find "extreme" hardship because aliens failed to establish that the hardship
that would result from their deportation would be "unique" or "unusual."9 '
However, an examination of the words Congress used to describe these two
standards reveals that a requirement of "unusualness" appears only in the
"exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship standard. For the "extreme"
hardship standard, Congress merely used the adjective "extreme" to modify the
term "hardship." Thus, it appears that the determination of "extreme" hardship
should be a measurement of degree, without additional consideration of whether
the hardship is unique or unusual. Still, while the INS has recognized that the
intent of Congress was to require a lesser degree of hardship under the "extreme"
hardship standard,9" some courts continue to equate the two standards as one.99
Various courts have recognized the difficulty in defining these standards. 0 0 In
INS v. Wang,'0 the Supreme Court expressly stated that "[t]he crucial question
in this case is what constitutes 'extreme hardship,"' but never attempted to define
the term. °2 The Court held that "[t]hese words are not self-explanatory, and
reasonable men could easily differ as to their construction. But the Act commits
their definition in the first instance to the Attorney General and his delegates.
S. .,,103 The Court went further and held that "[t]he Attorney General and his
delegates have the authority to construe 'extreme hardship' narrowly should they
deem it wise to do so. Such a narrow interpretation is consistent with the
'extreme hardship' language, which itself indicates the exceptional nature of the
suspension remedy."'" Clearly, the Court deemed the Attorney General to have
97. See, e.g., Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996) (defining "extreme hardship"
as "hardship that is 'unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected' upon
deportation"); Kuciemba v. INS, 92 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that given the
"exceptional" nature of the suspension remedy, hardship must be "substantially different from
and more severe than that suffered by the ordinary alien who is deported"); Vargas v. INS, 826
F.2d 1394, 1397 (5th Cir. 1987) (falling to find "uniquely extreme" hardship).
98. See supra note 46.
99. As the Seventh Circuit said:
[N]owhere do we find concrete support for the proposition that the amendment
of "exceptional and extremely unusual" to merely "extreme" hardship entails a
broadening of the remedy, much less a departure from norms established by the
BIA and approved by the courts. These norms require comparisons of like
applications for relief.... [I]t is not clear how, if it is supposed that the petitioner
is not required to show "unique" hardship, the BIA is then precluded from
considering relative claims. We need not now gratuitously extract from ambiguity
a construction not warranted by the language or legislative history of the statute.
Hemandez-Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1987).
100. See, e.g., INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (per curium); Bueno-Carrillo v.
Landon, 682 F.2d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The scope of 'extreme hardship' is not self-
explanatory."); In re Ige, 20 1. & N. Dec. 880, 882 (1994) ("The phrase 'extreme hardship' is
not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning.").
101. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
102. Id. at 144.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 145.
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considerable discretion in deciding what constitutes "extreme" hardship.
However, is it obvious that Congress intended a narrow interpretation?'05 Some
courts have interpreted the Court's language in Wang as mandating a narrow
interpretation.
10 6
A general starting point in the analysis of the "extreme" hardship standard is
found in the BIA's 1978 decision in In re Anderson.0 7 In Anderson, the BIA
addressed a 1975 House Judiciary Committee report discussing criteria with
reference to an "unusual" hardship requirement.0 8 The Committee suggested that
the Attorney General consider the following facts and circumstances among
others: (1) the economic and political conditions of the country to which the alien
would be returnable; (2) the alien's business or occupation; (3) the availability
of other means to obtain permanent residence in the United States; (4) whether
the alien was of special assistance to the United States or to the community; (5)
the alien's immigration history; and (6) the alien's position in the community.' 9
The BIA noted that these new factors were not inconsistent with prevailing
interpretations of "extreme" hardship."0 However, the BIA failed to
affrmnatively identify these factors as considerations until 1994."' Nevertheless,
such multi-factor balancing tests are remarkably unenlightening as explications
of the law. The factors do "little in the way of providing content to the
ambiguous phrase 'extreme hardship."12
One way to help provide content to the ambiguous standard is for the BIA to
publish precedential decisions illustrating factual circumstances which either do
or do not establish "extreme" hardship." 3 However, since the standard's
105. By reserving the ability to override the Attorney General's decision to suspend
deportation by legislative veto, Congress may have envisioned a broad interpretation. See supra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text. But see Hemandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 562 n.3
(1987) ("The fact that Congress has reserved for itself the right to veto a grant of discretionary
relief, but not a denial, is further evidence that Congress meant to narrow the availability of the
relief, not expand it.").
106. See, e.g., Najafi v. INS, 1997 WL 15240 (7th Cir.) (holding that since suspension is an
"exceptional remedy" the immigration judge is compelled to interpret "extreme" hardship
narrowly); Astrero v. INS, 1996 WL 738828 (9th Cir.) ("In determining whether to suspend
deportation on the grounds of extreme hardship, the Board construes extreme hardship
narrowly .... ).
107. 16 . & N. Dec. 596 (1978).
108. See id. at 597; H.R. REP. No. 94-504, at 17 (1975) (commenting on criteria which could
form the basis for discretionary relief for certain aliens whose deportation would result in
"unusual" hardship).
109. See H.R. REP. No. 94-504, at 17 (1975); Loue, supra note 11, at 61.
110. See Anderson, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 597. The court noted the "limited significance of
legislative committee statements in the area of administrative discretion." Id. at 599 n.1; see
also In re Riccio, 15 I. & N. Dec. 548, 549 (1976) ("Administrative discretion in suspension
of deportation cases should be exercised without reliance on such committee reports as
assumed indicators of Congressional policy.").
111. See In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 882 (1994).
112. In re O-J-O-, 1996 WL 393504 (B.I.A.) (Filppu, Board Member, dissenting).
113. Such designated decisions "shall serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the
same issue or issues." 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1996); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.3(c) (regarding
Service decisions), 103.9 (1996) (regarding availability of decisions).
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inception in 1962, the BIA has done little in this regard. The BIA has published
merely twenty some odd decisions adjudicating the merits of an "extreme
hardship" claim in cases where respondents have applied for suspension of
deportation."' Although far from illuminating, these decisions provide the best
available guidance regarding the "extreme" hardship standard for immigration
decisionmakers as well as the public.
The most extensive treatment of the "extreme" hardship standard is found in
the BIA's 1996 decision in In re O-J-O-. 5 Unfortunately, the concurring and
dissenting opinions tend to raise more issues than they resolve. Furthermore, any
light shed on the "extreme" hardship standard has been, for the most part,
rendered moot as Congress changed the required hardship showing from
"extreme" to "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship under the new
general cancellation of deportation relief provision for long-term nonpermanent
resident aliens." 6 In light of the BIA's recognition in O-J-O- that the hardship
standards were not one and the same, a House Conference report indicated that
"[t]he 'extreme hardship' standard ha[d] been weakened by recent administrative
decisions .... Such a ruling would be inconsistent with the standard set forth in
new section 240A(b)(1)."". Thus, as the INS began to clarify the "rules of the
game" for participants in determining "extreme" hardship, Congress responded
by changing the rules. The stricter "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship
standard now remains for the majority of cancellation of deportation
determinations."s
While the BIA has identified general factors it would consider in determining
these hardship standards, these factors merely provide a framework for analysis.
The "elements required to establish [the requisite] hardship are dependent upon
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case."" 9 The weight and particular
relevance given to any one factor is still left to the discretion of individual
decisionmakers. Therefore, with no clear guidance from Congress or the INS, the
critical definition of the hardship standards, and the determination of whether an
alien's circumstances meet those standards, is left to the unguided and
unrestrained discretion of "impressionable and fallible human beings at all levels
of the administrative hierarchy."' 2 °
114. See O-J-O-, 1996 WL 393504 (Holmes, Board Member, concurring).
115. Id
116. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
117. H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 104-828, at 213 (1996) (citation omitted).
118. The "extreme" hardship standard remains only for cancellation of deportation decisions
involving spouses and children subjected to extreme cruelty by a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident. See supra notes 53-54, 59 and accompanying text. Let us hope that the INS
does not require "extreme cruelty" to be "substantially different from" that experienced by the
ordinary spouse or child subjected to cruelty. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
119. In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 882 (1994).
120. Maurice A. Roberts, The Exercise ofAdministrative Discretion Under the Immigration
Laws, 13 SAN DIEGOL. REv. 144, 147 (1975).
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II. THE CANCELLATION OF DEPORTATION DECISION
In determining whether to grant cancellation of deportation relief, immigration
decisionmakers generally undertake a two-step process. First, a decisionmaker
determines whether the alien meets the statutory eligibility requirements. Second,
the decisionmaker exercises discretion as to whether she will grant relief. Despite
the decisionmaker's express exercise of discretion in the second step, the
statutory eligibility requirements in the first step "are themselves awash in a sea
of discretion." ' 2' Due to the vague and open-ended formulations of the "extreme
hardship" and "exceptional and extremely unique hardship" requirements, the
decisionmaker has the discretion not only to determine whether an alien has met
the hardship requirement, but also has the discretion to determine what this
requisite degree of hardship is.'
22
Additionally, with no guidance from Congress, the exercise of these
discretionary determinations is also left to the discretion of the Attorney General
and her subordinates. That is, the manner in which the decisionmaker exercises
his discretion (whether determined by established guidelines, rules, or merely by
the decisionmaker's whim) is itself discretionary. Hence, these multiple layers
of discretion reveal the ubiquitous discretion vested in immigration
decisionmakers.
As discretion has become an indispensable necessity in the operation of
government,'" confining that discretion has become critical to avoid the potential
for its abuse. Moreover, selecting an appropriate combination of methods to limit
discretion is often difficult and complicated.' 24 However, in the context of
granting discretionary relief, a conception that less safeguards are needed than
in the administration of legal rights appears to have simplified this task.' 25 In
cancellation of deportation proceedings, this rights-privilege distinction holds
that although an alien has a right to a discretionary determination, the granting
of relief is considered a matter of grace.' 26 Accordingly, it follows that an alien
121. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 9, at 653.
122. See INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (holding that the INA commits the
definition of "extreme hardship" in the first instance to the Attorney General and her delegates).
123. See 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 17.1 (3d ed. 1994).
124. See id.
125. This conception is based upon a dichotomy between "rights" (interests enjoyed as a
matter of right) and mere "privileges" (interests created by the grace of the government). See,
e.g., Lucy E. SAYLER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 249 (1995) ("The usual explanation for the judiciary's different
treatment of immigration cases lies in the distinction between rights and privileges....
[Deportable aliens are] seen as clothed merely with suspendible privileges rather than rights.");
see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (setting forth a three-part balancing test to
determine what procedures satisfy due process in administrative proceedings); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254"(1970) (holding that procedural due process protects "entitlements").
126. See, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956) ("Although such aliens have been
given a right to a discretionary determination on an application for suspension, a grant thereof
is manifestly not a matter of right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter
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can claim no legal right to fundamental procedural protections in the exercise of
that discretion.
Yet, in light of the potentially devastating consequences for the alien, 27 should
these discretionary determinations remain wholly unrestrained? The answer lies
somewhere in the underlying purpose of the decision and the proper role of
discretion. This Note posits that the controlling importance of the cancellation
of deportation decision is to administer individualized justice where, although
an alien is in violation of our immigration laws, notions of leniency and
humanitarianism control to alleviate the most compelling personal hardships.
Discretion is thus necessary to allow the decisionmaker to consider unique
individual circumstances. However, proper guidance and restraint are essential
to minimize injustice from the arbitrary exercise of this discretion. 2 '
Professor Koch outlines at least five different uses for the term "discretion" in
administrative law. 29 Two of these uses are relevant in examining the use of
discretion in cancellation of deportation decisionmaking. What Koch terms
"individualizing discretion" appears to identify the discretion needed in
cancellation of deportation decisions. "Discretion, used in this way, refers to the
discretionary decisionmaker's authority to adjust applicable rules at the margin
in order to improve a program's ability to do individual justice." 3 ' The Attorney
General, ideally, uses this kind of discretion when she determines whether to
administer justice by granting an alien cancellation of deportation relief. Thus,
of grace.") (citation omitted). The Supreme Court once stated that it had "fully and finally
rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern
the applicability of procedural due process rights." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
571 (1972). Although the rights-privilege distinction may have been blurred in other areas of
administrative law, its vitality appears to remain in the area of immigration law. See SAYLER,
supra note 125, at 250 (suggesting that the "emergence of a unitary standard of administrative
due process, applicable to all agencies regardless of the programs they administer [should]
result in higher standards of due process in immigration proceedings").
127. Note that the burden of deportation does not fall solely on the alien: "employers may
lose productive employees, neighborhoods may lose valued residents, and family and friends
may be deprived of significant personal relationships." ALEINIKOFF, supra note 9, at 652.
128. For the most thorough treatment of discretionary decisions involving justice to
individuals, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
142-187 (1969). The Author hopes that this Note is in the vein of further study that Professor
Davis envisioned.
129. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review ofAdministrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 469, 470 (1986).
The term discretion has at least five different uses in administrative law. The
authority to make individualizing decisions in the application of general rules can
be characterized as "individualizing discretion." Freedom to fill in gaps in
delegated authority in order to execute assigned administrative functions may be
called "executing discretion." The power to take action to further societal goals
is "policymaking discretion." If no review is permitted, the agency is exercising
"unbridled discretion." Finally, if the decision cannot by its very nature be
reviewed, the agency is exercising "numinous discretion."
'd. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
130. Id. at 472.
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decisionmakers in cancellation of deportation cases should use "[d]iscretion [as]
a tool, indispensable for individualization of justice."''
Although such discretion is a very positive feature of the cancellation of
deportation process, it is nevertheless subject to abuse. "Discretion is a tool only
when properly used; like an axe, it can be a weapon for mayhem or murder."' 32
Discretionary decisionmaking must therefore be "properly confined, structured,
and checked."' 33 However, Congress has done little to confine or structure the
Attorney General's discretion and ha done much to remove an essential check.
Although limited, judicial review of "individualized discretion" in cancellation
of deportation decisionmaking served as a check on impermissible deviations
from perceived norms. 3 ' By prohibiting judicial review, Congress has vested
what Koch terms "unbridled discretion" in cancellation of deportation
decisionmakers.' "Unbridled discretion is complete. For reasons that have little
to do with the potential value of court involvement, the court has no authority
over the core decision."' 36 Although "individualizing discretion" entails limited
review to help assure its proper exercise,'37 "unbridled discretion" is
unreviewable. Thus, what once began as benign discretionary power in
cancellation of deportation decisionmaking is now potentially abusive.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CANCELLATION OF DEPORTATION
DECISIONMAKING
Arguably, in no other area of the law has the role of the judiciary been
circumscribed more than in immigration. The development of "an insidious
synergism of doctrines" has severely undermined meaningful judicial review by
counseling broad deference to discretionary agency decisionmaking' 38 This Part
131. DAVIs, supra note 128, at 25.
132. Id.
133. Id. at26.
134. Although the statutory language of the cancellation of removal provision remains
vague, general notions of its administration have developed from a sparse number of published
BIA precedents. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. Although these notions are
generally insufficient to enable a reviewing court to determine the correctness of any giver
decision, the court can check for the potential for error. "The purpose of individualizinj
discretion is to allow the agency to fine tune the rules-administrative, judicial, o
statutory-to do individual justice; the court controls only for extreme risk of error in suc
judgments." Koch, Jr., supra note 129, at 476.
135. See id. at 495-502.
136. Id. at 496.
137. Three primary tools have developed for courts to assure the proper exercise
cancellation of deportation making discretion: (1) requiring the decisionmaker to consider;
the evidence presented by the alien regarding the potential hardship; (2) requiring t
decisionmaker to consider the evidence cumulatively; and (3) requiring the decisionmaker
give reasons for her decision, thus showing a proper consideration for the circumstances. .'
Note, Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights ofAliens, 96 HARv.
REV. 1286, 1396 (1983).
138. See Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigrat
Decisionmaking, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 862 (1994).
[Vol. 72:885
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
will review the troubled course that judicial review of cancellation of deportation
decisionmaking has followed until suffering its demise at the hands of Congress.
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine
In the context of immigration, the "plenary power doctrine"'39 has historically
been invoked to support the argument for broad judicial deference. 4 ° The
doctrine is premised on the notion that immigration decisions relate to delicate
foreign policy issues that the political branch of government should resolve.'4 '
Although the plenary power doctrine technically applies only to constitutional
challenges to immigration legislation, its judicial adoption reflects a mood that
immigration decisions are largely immune from judicial review.'42
Hence, by analogy the plenary power doctrine serves as a method to prevent
judicial interference in agency decisionmaking. Courts have selectively invoked
this doctrine to shield agency decisions from meaningful judicial review.'43
Taken to its extreme, the doctrine lends itself as an intellectual justification for
courts to turn a blind eye toward potential abuses and agency excesses.
B. The Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Rise of Chevron's Presumption of Deference
In theory, the "nondelegation doctrine" holds that Congress may not delegate
its legislative powers to administrative agencies."' Accordingly, upon
139. In the late 1800s, the Supreme Court invoked this doctrine to emphasize the
extraordinary powers of Congress over immigration. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 705-32 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding
"[w]hatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may have obtained previous to the Act of
October 1, 1888, to return to the United States after their departure, is held at the will of the
Government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure"). For a critique of the plenary power
doctrine, see, for example, Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545
(1990).
140. See, e.g., INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988); INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444,
451-52 (1985); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("'[O]ver no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens."
(quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); Amanullah
v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987) ("By statutory enactment, Congress has delegated its
unusually broad dominion in the immigration field to the Attorney General.").
141. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) ("Such matters are so
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference.").
142. See Heyman, supra note 138, at 862.
143. See, e.g., Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110; Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. at 452; Fiallo, 430 U.S. at
792; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976); Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558,
561 (5th Cir. 1987); Achacoso-Sanchez, 779 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (7th Cir. 1985).
144, The United States Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ..... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Since the
Constitution grants legislative powers to Congress, any delegation of that power is therefore
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That congress cannot
1997]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
authorizing agency action, Congress must provide standards "adequate to convey
to the agency its lawful role and to appropriately confine the agency's discretion
'within banks that keep it from overflowing."", 145 In practice, however, courts
have routinely allowed Congress to delegate extremely broad powers to
administrative agencies. 46 Although the Supreme Court has never expressly
renounced the nondelegation doctrine, the doctrine has remained essentially
dormant for over fifty years.
47
Clearly, agency decisionmaking must be secured in the language of the statute
the agency is authorized to implement. 4 That language provides the standards
which guide and define the scope of the agency's decisionmaking power. Yet,
"[i]n the absence of adequate standards, it is impossible to judge whether an
agency's decisionmaking is in accordance with its authorizing statute."' 49 Thus,
as a result of vague or excessively broad legislative enactments, "[judicial]
deference flows from the simple fact that courts refuse to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine."'
50
Granted, it is impossible for legislators to foresee every possible situation that
may arise during the life of a statute. Moreover, legislatures are not infallible
institutions. Hence, whether drafters worked flawlessly or not, agency-
administered statutes are bound to contain ambiguities.' Who then is to resolve
these ambiguities? Two institutions have assumed the role of giving-meaning to
agency-administered statutes: (1) the agency charged with responsibility to
administer the statute; and (2) a reviewing court.5 ' However, an overwhelming
trend toward affording deference to administrative agencies has exceedingly
restricted the role of the courts. Although this trend can be traced to the demise
of the nondelegation doctrine, deference has reached new heights since the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.153
delegate legislative power ... is a principle universally recognized .... "). See generally 1
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 123 § 2.6.
145. E.P. Krauss, Unchecked Powers: The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 797, 799 (1992) (quoting Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., dissenting)).
146. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that Congress's
broad delegation to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines was not
an excessive delegation of legislative power). For a critique of the Supreme Court's failure to
enforce the nondelegation doctrine, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
147. At one time, albeit briefly, the Supreme Court enforced the nondelegation doctrine. See
Panama Ref, 293 U.S. at 388; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
148. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 123, § 3.1.
149. Krauss, supra note 145, at 799.
150. Heyman, supra note 138, at 868.
151. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 123, § 3.1.
152. See id.
153. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Chevron introduced a new era of broad judicial deference to agency
decisionmaking."' Section 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA")
provides a reviewing court with the authority to "decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action."'5 5 Nowhere does the APA
mention judicial deference to agency determinations of law, yet Chevron has
clearly shifted the balance in favor of deference to agency interpretations of
agency-administered statutes.5
6
In Chevron,"7 the Supreme Court set forth the modem test for judicial review
of administrative agency interpretations of statutory provisions. The case
involved a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
interpretation of the statutory term "stationary source." The term was part of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,"5' to authorize and impose limitations on
emissions. The EPA regulations interpreted the statute to allow states to treat all
of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though
they were encased within a single "bubble." The District of Columbia Circuit
Court noted that the legislation and its history were inexact with respect to
whether the term "stationary source" could be interpreted in accordance with the
single "bubble rule." The court then performed its own interpretation of the term
and set aside the agency ruling.5 9
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, enunciating a new two-part test for
courts to apply to agency action predicated on the agency's authorizing statute.
The Court held that if Congress has been silent or ambiguous about the meaning
of a statutory term, courts should defer to a permissible agency construction.1
61
The Court reasoned that Congress's failure to elucidate a term constituted a
delegation to the agency to interpret the law.' 6 ' Finding that the language and
legislative history of the statute indicated that Congress had no specific intent
about the statutory term, the Court affirmed the EPA's reasonable definition of
"stationary source."' 162
154. See Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 284 (1986) (describing Chevron as revolutionary and evolutionary). A search for Chevron
in Westlaw's ALLCASES database produced over 2,500 citations in February of 1997.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
156. For a critique of this trend, see, for example, Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363 (1986); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 452
(1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 2071
(1990). For support of this trend, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301 (1988);
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511 (1989); Starr, supra note 154.
157. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
158. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (applicable amendment codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1994)).
159. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
160. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
161. Id. at 843-44.
162. Id. at 864-65.
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Thus, the Supreme Court created what has been termed the "Chevron Two-
Step" 63 analysis for courts to apply to all attempts by agencies to give meaning
to the statutes they administer:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. '
If the answer to the first inquiry is "no," the analysis moves to step two:
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute . 65
On its facts, Chevron does not appear to be a significant departure from earlier
deferential approaches to judicial review. In Chevron, the agency adopted its
interpretation by a legislative rule and involved both highly technical matters and
difficult policy choices. Traditionally, courts have accorded greater deference to
administrative agencies as a practical matter due to factors such as the agency's
relative expertise. 66 However, Chevron did not only grant mere deference to
administrative agencies, it granted controlling weight. If Chevron provided
controlling effect merely to an agency's legislative rule interpreting a highly
political and technical term, its holding would not have been so revolutionary.
Chevron, however, "expanded the class of statutory constructions due controlling
effect." 167 The Supreme Court has since approved of its application to
adjudication. 8
Although Chevron's analytical framework seems quite incompatible with the
famous pronouncement in Marbury v. Madison169 that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"' 70 it has
been argued that the resolution of an ambiguous statute necessarily involves
policy judgment.' If Congress fails to elucidate a statutory term, this implicitly
163. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 123, § 3.2.
164. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted).
166."[S]uch factors [included] whether the agency's interpretation had been consistent over
a long period, whether the agency had helped shepherd the legislation through Congress,
whether the agency's interpretation was adopted near the time the statute was passed, and
whether the agency possessed special expertise." Starr, supra note 154, at 297.
167. Kevin W. Saunders, Agency Interpretations and Judicial Review: A Search for
Limitations on the Controlling Effect Given Agency Statutory Constructions, 30 ARIZ. L. REV.
769, 776 (1988).
168. See, e.g., De Bartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568 (1988); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 123, § 3.5.
169. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
170. Id. at 177.
171. See, e.g., I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 123, § 3.2; Pierce, supra note 156.
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constitutes a delegation to the agency to make policy choices.7 2 Presumably, as
part of the executive branch, agencies are therefore more accountable than judges
to make such choices. In the Court's words:
Judges ... are not part of either political branch of the Government....
In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon
the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments.
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left
to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in
light of everyday realities.'
However, an examination of the INS's administration of cancellation of
deportation relief raises questions as to whether the agency should be deferred
to because of its political legitimacy. First, is it clear that decisionmakers within
the agency really are accountable? Agency decisionmakers continue to make
cancellation of deportation determinations in low-visibility proceedings through
case-by-case adjudication. By not articulating the standards for these
determinations through a promulgated rule, "the agency avoids crystallizing the
issue for congressional review."'7 4  Moreover, accountability through
congressional oversight is further circumscribed by the fact that legislators can
acquiesce to a controversial law without affirmatively taking responsibility for
it.175
In Chevron, the Supreme Court rationalized that the accountability of
legislators that is lost through delegation is somehow replaced by the
accountability of the President. 76 In the context of immigration, to whom would
the President be held accountable? For the most part, those individuals directly
172. As the Court noted:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created.
.. program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules
to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.... If Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted).
173. Id. at 865-66.
174. SCHOENBROD, supra note 146, at 101.
175. As Schoenbrod explains:
[A] controversial law can take effect only if a sufficient number of legislators
support it explicitly and on the record. In contrast, the oversight notion of
accountability allows Congress to sustain an agency law through inaction or to
change the agency law through informal activity of a few influential members.
This enables legislators to accede to a controversial law without having to assume
any personal or public responsibility for it.
Id. at 102.
176. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
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affected by immigration decisions are excluded from the political process.'17
Moreover, assuming a majority of the voting public were actually aware of, and
objected to, one agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term, it is
unlikely that the President will feel much political pressure.'78 We must endorse
our President's positions wholesale.1
7 1
Furthermore, Professor Heyman points out that the Attorney General's
decision is spoken of as if "she were really making the[] decisions and building
a useful repository of expertise."'8 0 However, "these decisions are 'made in the
depths of the bureaucracy."' "'[T]he fact remains that [immigration
decisionmaking] is exercised by impressionable and fallible human beings at all
levels of the administrative hierarchy .... [For] in practice decisionmaking has
been delegated to and is exercised by a host of lesser officials."' 2 With the
Attorney General so far removed from the actual decisionmaking, surely it is
naive to think that immigration judges are politically accountable. Moreover,
with no standards, it is unlikely that an agency decisionmaker can be held
accountable to anyone. Clearly, it is impossible to sanction someone when there
are no standards against which to judge the correctness of that person's actions.
Second, assuming that administering cancellation of deportation relief is a
policy matter, would Congress have intended to delegate the power to make
policy to individual cancellation of deportation decisionmakers? Immigration
decisionmaking mirrors the tug and pull of a multitude of competing interests
inherent in the national debate on immigration policy.8 3 As Peter Schuck wrote:
The ideological poles of current debate are easy to categorize. At one end
are libertarians and free market purists. They favor not just expansion but
essentially open borders ....
177. See Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning
of Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 444 (1993) ("'Aliens'
are lawfully excluded from the political process.").
178. Johnson explains that:
Even if a majority of the voting public objects to the executive branch's
immigration policies and practices, most citizens are not likely to feel their
interests being directly affected. Thus, few might be expected to mobilize
politically to change how two relatively obscure administrative agencies, the INS
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review, treat noncitizens seeking to
immigrate to the United States. Instead, the President, and hence the Attorney
General, might only be expected to be subject to distinctly anti-immigrant
political pressures, expressed by a vocal minority of citizens calling for increased
enforcement efforts based on the belief that they are directly affected by
immigration. Such pressures are more likely to surface when (as often happens
during a recession) noncitizens are blamed for displacing American workers.
Id. (citations omitted).
179. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 146, at 106.
180. Heyman, supra note 138, at 894.
181. Id. (quoting Hemandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 567 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J.,
dissenting)).
182. Id. at 887-88 (quoting Maurice A. Roberts, The Exercise ofAdministrative Discretion
Under the Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144, 147 (1975)).
183. See id. at 887.
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At the restrictionist end is a melange of groups animated by anxieties about
migrants' effects on the environment, labor market competition, population
growth, and public services." 4
Clearly, in cancellation of deportation proceedings, a balance must be struck
between the conflicting policies of immigration law enforcement and
humanitarian relief. However, should we permit such policy choices to vary with
the attitude and personal preferences of those within the bureaucracy? In fact,
variation among individual decisionmakers suggests that no uniform policy
choice is made at all. By simply failing to legislate with sufficient specificity,
Congress has surrendered its role in propounding national policy. Chevron
effectively "turns the non-delegation doctrine on its head."'18 5
Setting aside such policymaking implications and the likelihood that political
accountability is more fiction than reality, how would the "Chevron Two-Step"
analysis apply to the ambiguous phrase "extreme hardship" in cancellation of
deportation cases? Notwithstanding the debate as to when a statutory term is
ambiguous,"8 6 it would seem an easy task. Indeed, INS v. Wang,1 7 which held that
the INA committed the "definition in the first instance to the Attorney General
and his delegates"' 8' 8 was used as support in Chevron.'8 9
By applying this two-step approach to the statutory phrase "extreme hardship,"
Chevron's first question as to whether the statute is clear must be answered "no."
Clearly Congress has not spoken on the precise question at issue, nor is the intent
of Congress clear. Failing an affirmative response on the first inquiry, we move
on to step two. Is the Attorney General's interpretation a permissible statutory
construction? This determination is much more problematic as the Attorney
General and her subordinates have yet to articulate a clear definition of "extreme
hardship."
Although the BIA has published a scant few precedential decisions, '90 is the
dearth of any clear guidelines or standards a reasonable interpretation? What is
a "permissible" or "reasonable" interpretation? These terms are not self-
explanatory. If Congress has not spoken on the issue, what standards or
principles limit a reasonable interpretation? Given the remedial purpose of the
184. Id. (quoting Peter H. Schuck, The Great Immigration Debate, AM. PROSPECT, Fall
1990, at 100, 101).
185. Krauss, supra note 145, at 820.
186. Even when there is agreement as to the application of the Chevron analysis to a
particular case, there still may be disagreement as to when the text is clear and what "traditional
tools of statutory construction" are available. See, e.g., DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 123, § 3.6;
Farina, supra note 156, at 460 n.41 (noting the many approaches to legislative history as a
"traditional tool of statutory construction" after Chevron); Scalia, supra note 156, at 520.
However, under any approach, it would be difficult to say that the term "extreme hardship" is
anything but ambiguous.
187. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
188. Id. at 144.
189. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 n.13. The footnote was used to illustrate when a legislature
implicitly delegates to an agency the authority to interpret a statutory provision, and that a court
may not substitute its own construction for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency. IM
190. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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provision, is making cancellation of deportation relief virtually impossible to
obtain a reasonable interpretation? From the language of the statute, at least one
limitation should be obvious. Congress provided two separate hardship
standards. Therefore, these standards cannot be the same.'9 ' Yet, without an
affinative articulation of either standard, how can a reviewing court determine
the presence of a permissible interpretation? Could a court have reasoned that
"the first instance" for which the agency to define the term had long since passed
and thus offer its own interpretation? Probably not, but by failing to develop the
requisite hardship standards the agency seems to have abdicated its
responsibility. If this is so, who then must assume this responsibility?
In Hernandez-Patino v. INS,192 the Seventh Circuit stated that by "refusing to
define 'extreme' hardship fully, [Congress] avoided the substantive policy
decision and has deferred to agency expertise."'93 Thus, if Congress is unable or
chooses not to decide a policy matter, is it clear that INS employees have a
decisive advantage over the courts to do so? As a practical matter, with the
absence of agreed policy and a lack of information for decisionmaking,
immigration decisionmakers have no obvious advantage of expertise over the
courts. Furthermore, if cancellation of deportation decisionmaking is viewed not
as a policy matter, but as the administration of individualized justice, oversight
by the courts seems particularly appropriate. The institutional characteristics and
the traditional concern of the courts (protecting individuals) enhance a judge's
ability to "temper what may sometimes be the more narrow interpretive
perspective of a single, mission-oriented [immigration decisionmaker].' 94
Nonetheless, though courts may have a relative expertise with respect to
ordinary judicial skills, this expertise is in the application of legal standards to
a particular set of facts. If standards for the administration of cancellation of
deportation relief are ill-defined or nonexistent, how then can a court provide a
meaningful check on agency decisionmaking?
191. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that the BIA cannot treat
two separate but related standards as one); see also notes 99-101 and accompanying text
(discussing the blurred distinction between the "extreme" and "exceptional and extremely
unusual" hardship standards).
192. 831 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1987).
193. Id. at 753.
194. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.1, at 435
(1993).
By training and experience judges are particularly adept at interpreting legal texts
and resolving constitutional and statutory issues. As generalist judges they bring
an important added dimension to their interpretive task. They are not part of any
administrative agency and have no particular regulatory mission to fulfill. As
federal judges in particular, they also have a position with life tenure and a salary
that cannot be lowered. Such institutional characteristics enhance the ability of
courts to apply their legal, interpretive skills in a relatively objective and
independent manner.
Id.; see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 177 (discussing the anti-immigrant, pro-enforcement bias of
immigration decisionmakers).
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C. Unreviewability Law
Section 706 of the APA provides for judicial review of "abuse of
discretion."'9' However, the APA also provides a "committed to agency
discretion" exception to judicial review. 9 6 The Supreme Court resolved these
seemingly conflicting provisions by construing the "committed to agency
discretion" provision quite narrowly.'97
In Heckler v. Cheney,9 ' inmates sentenced to death by injection of lethal drugs
claimed that the drugs were not in compliance with the laws administered by the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). The Court considered whether the FDA
abused its discretion by failing to investigate and take enforcement actions. The
Court saw the FDA's decision not to act as an instance of prosecutorial
discretion unbounded by standards. Affirming a principle from Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe,' the Court held that in a narrow range of
circumstances "'statutes are drawn in such broad terms in a given case there is
no law to apply.""'2 "
A broad reading of Heckler suggests that when a statute provides no judicially
manageable standards to detect abuse, there is no law to apply. Therefore, the
argument goes, with "no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's exercise of discretion," '' a "court obviously cannot conduct this
inquiry."2 2 Although commentators point out that review is always possible aside
from the governing statutes,2 3 the contrary view has attracted many 2 4
Is the review of cancellation of deportation cases a situation where there is no
law to apply? The disturbing answer may be "yes." Due to the holding in INS v.
Wang,' judicial review is doubly restricted by (1) the discretionary nature of the
grant of relief and (2) the lack of a clear articulation of the weight accorded to
particular factors in determining the requisite hardship. Without the development
of guidelines for the exercise of discretion or the determination of the requisite
hardship, some courts will simply defer to the agency because its discretion
cannot be tested for error.
195. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1994).
196. Id. § 701(a)(2) (1994).
197. See Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
198. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
199. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
200. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410
(1971)).
201. Id.
202. Heyman, supra note 138, at 873 (quoting Ronald M. Levin, Understanding
Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MrNN. L. REv. 689, 707 (1990) (footnotes
omitted)).
203. Reviewing courts can "inquire into such matters as whether an agency misunderstood
the facts, departed from precedent, or made an unconscionable value judgment." Id.
204. See id
205. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
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D. The "Hard Look" and "Soft Glance" Approaches to
Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration
Decisionmaking
In the context of discretionary immigration decisionmaking, we can generally
place the judicial approaches toward these foregoing themes into the following
two familiar administrative law categories: "hard look" and "soft glance"
review."° Aside from the historically liberal approach in the Ninth Circuit," 7 we
can identify two modestly distinctive approaches as personified in opinions by
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit.
As Professor Heyman attests, Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Achacoso-
Sanchez v. INS,2 °8 adopts, "in virtually pristine form," the highly deferential
judicial attitude limiting meaningful judicial review." 9 Typifying the "soft
glance" approach, Judge Easterbrook reviewed the denial of various forms of
discretionary relief to a particularly litigious alien. In doing so, he first defined
the scope of judicial review with reference to the discretion vested in agency
decisionmakers by invoking both the plenary power doctrine and the rationale
behind Chevron:
The discretion of immigration officials is exceptionally broad. The Supreme
Court recently suggested that it is absolute. The Board's discretion is broad
in part because it administers the immigration laws, and "over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete" than with respect
to immigration. Congress has the power to make distinctions on account of
race, national origin, and other considerations that it would be forbidden to
use in drawing distinctions among residents of the country. When Congress
does not lay down rules, its power devolves on the executive branch, which
then may consider factors of its own choosing.210
Judge Easterbrook then elaborated on the limits ofjudicial review in the absence
of standards for judges to use:
In the language of administrative law, the grant of discretionary relief
under the immigration laws is a question on which there is "no law to apply,"
and when there is no law to apply judicial review is exceedingly constricted.
When there is no governing legal rule, it is fatuous to speak of "error" in the
disposition of a given case. Judges, specialists in the applications of
206. The "hard look" doctrine counsels a court to ensure that "the agency has... really
taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has ... genuinely engaged in reasoned
decision-making." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970). For the Supreme Court's most famous application of hard look review, see Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). See generally
AMAN, JR. & MAYTON, supra note 194, at 504-15 (discussing the origins and application of the
"hard look" doctrine).
207. See, e.g., Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 139
(1981) ("[T]he statute should be liberally construed to effectuate its ameliorative purpose..
• ."1).
208. 779 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1985).
209. See Heyman, supra note 138, at 874.
210. Achacoso-Sanchez, 779 F.2d at 1264 (citations omitted) (quoting Oceanic Stream
Navigating Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
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standards of decision to facts, and in the rooting out of error, have little to
contribute. 21'
Thus, the "soft glance" approach "reveals an indisposition to afford
meaningful judicial review in the absence of articulated statutory or regulatory
standards., 212 As no meaningful standards exist for administering cancellation
of deportation relief, "soft glance" review effectively assures but one result.
On the other hand, another approach has emerged where judges appear to
demonstrate aggressive oversight over the discretionary determinations of
immigration decisionmakers. This "hard look" approach illustrates that such
oversight is possible despite the limitations on judicial review noted above.
Judge Posner's candid opinion in Salameda v. INS2 3 exemplifies this approach.
In reviewing a denial of suspension of deportation relief, he first
acknowledged the limitations ofjudicial review: "It is up to the Board to decide
what shall count as 'extreme hardship.' Judicial review is limited to making sure
that the Board has considered in a rational fashion the issues tendered by the
alien's application. 2 4 He then went on to note the potential impairment on
reasoned decisionmaking due to the agency's overwhelming caseload:
The proceedings of the Immigration and Naturalization Service are
notorious for delay, and the opinions rendered by its judicial officers,
including the members of the Board of Immigration Appeals, often flunk
minimum standards of adjudicative rationality. The lodgment of this troubled
Service in the Department of Justice of a nation that was built by immigrants
and continues to be enriched by a flow of immigration is an irony that should
not escape notice. We imagine that Congress is more to blame than the
Department or even the INS itself. The agency is absurdly understaffed. In
1994,... the Board of Immigration Appeals had an effective membership of
only four-to handle the more than 14,000 appeals lodged with the Board
that year.215
This statement not only illustrates the heavy burden placed upon immigration
decisionmakers, but also reveals something potentially more sinister. Obviously,
the mere weight of caseloads can make immigration decisionmakers
unsympathetic to an alien's plight. In addition, a seasoned decisionmaker may be
slow in finding a particular alien's potential hardship "extreme" after hearing
several similar hardship cases. However, critics argue that the agency's
increasing caseload burden contributes to an anti-immigrant, pro-enforcement
bias.2" 6 Thus, the underlying agenda of docket-clearing may prevail over reasoned
decisionmaking and the interests of the alien seeking relief.
In Salameda, Judge Posner went on to hold that the agency failed to offer a
rational justification for its order denying suspension of deportation. He
explained that the BIA without explanation changed its position on community
service as an element of extreme hardship. "[I]n light of the holdings of the other
211. Id. at 1265 (citation omitted).
212. Heyman, supra note 138, at 874-75.
213. 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995).
214. Id. at 449 (citation omitted).
215. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
216. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 177.
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circuits and the Board's apparent acquiescence in the immigration judge's
adoption of that position and the government's acknowledgment that it is the
Board's position, we think it is the law of this case that community-assistance
must be considered.,
21 7
Judge Posner concluded by noting his exceptional scrutiny and offering his
own take on the underlying problem impairing the agency's decisionmaking:
We may seem awfully picky in remanding a case in which the showing of
extreme hardship is as marginal as it is here, and awfully unforgiving of the
resource constraints that prevent the judicial officers of the immigration
service from doing a competent job. But the government has not argued
harmless error, and understaffing is not a defense to a violation of principles
of administrative law admitted to bind the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. (It would be pretty weird if an agency could get a reduced standard
of judicial review of its decisions simply by asking Congress for a reduced
appropriation!) The richest nation in the world, which happens to be a nation
of immigrants, can afford to staff its immigration service? 8
Given the restraints on judicial review, Judge Posner focused his concern on
whether the INS judicial officers acted in a "rational manner. 219 Even under
wholly open-ended statutes, agencies must operate according to "[t]raditional
standards of rationality and fair purpose.,, 220 However, Posner also attempted to
provide some uniformity by not allowing inconsistent assertions of what hardship
factors need to be considered. He assured that it was "up to the Board to decide
what shall count as 'extreme hardship.' 21' But through his intolerance for
procedural irregularities and sloppy thinking, he seems to communicate a desire
to help the BIA define its own conception of "extreme hardship."
Certainly, the BIA may still deny cancellation backed by a new explanation
crafted to overcome the court's criticism.222 Nonetheless, perhaps the BIA's next
cancellation decision would scrutinize the alien's hardship claim in more detail.
Of course, remanding a decision does not ensure closer agency scrutiny, but
perhaps requiring the appearance of deliberation will result in real agency
deliberation. Although a more straightforward approach seems better, is it not
this type of dialogue that is needed to help develop the law?
Professor Davis long ago observed that writings and discussions are primarily
focused in areas where decisions are governed by rules and standards rather than
by discretion. 2 3 Thus, rules provide for evenhanded justice. Through case
decisions, scholarly articles, and general debate the law governed by rules grows.
However, we pay relatively little attention to law which is governed by
discretion-where the potential for injustice is greatest. Thus, we leave this area
of the law underdeveloped.
217. Salameda, 70 F.3d at 450.
218. Id. at 452.
219. Id. at 451.
220. Heckler v. Cheney, 470"U.S. 821, 853 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring).
221. Salameda, 70 F.3d at 449.
222. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study ofFederal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1059-60 (1990).
223. See DAVIS, supra note 128, at v-vii.
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A dialogue between the courts and the agency would help promote that
development. Let us not forget that agencies, judges, and legislators alike are
engaged in the business of democratic government. They are interdependent and
cooperation is necessary to further the law. Through a collaborative approach,
this area of the law governed by discretion could mature effectively.224
Congress has nevertheless eliminated any such dialogue between the courts and
the INS. Given the erosion of meaningful judicial review, perhaps Congress is
wise to prohibit it entirely thereby avoiding delay and saving both administrative
and judicial resources. "Better no judicial review at all than a charade that gives
the imprimatur without the substance of judicial confirmation that the agency is
not acting unreasonably.2 2 5
Still, even with the manifest shortcomings of judicial review, it should not be
summarily dismissed. Legislation that grants such unrestricted power over an
individual should alarm those on both sides of the immigration debate. If
Congress must eliminate judicial review, then the creation of standards by which
the agency is to administer cancellation of deportation relief is critical. As
neither Congress nor the INS has developed any such standards, injustices are
inevitable.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
"Chief Ben American Horse of the Sioux Indian tribe once gave the following
advice to Alben Barkely, who was then Vice president of the United States:
'Young fellow ... [b]e careful with your immigration laws. We were careless
with ours.' ' 6 That advice, considering the source, is illustrative of both the
legitimacy and the self-righteousness of our nativist fears. The issue of illegal
immigration often raises anti-immigrant sentiments. Indeed, we are frustrated as
current legal mechanisms seem incapable of halting illegal immigration.
However, since we have failed miserably in protecting the borders, this should
not mandate an abandonment of our humanitarian values and the integrity of our
immigration system.
Time will tell how effective the IIRIRA is on illegal immigration. However,
Congress's new restrictions on cancellation of deportation relief and prohibition
ofjudicial review will do little, if anything, to help deter illegal immigration. In
fiscal year 1995, the INS received only 4254 applications for cancellation of
deportation relief, and only one-half were granted. 7 The small vulnerable group
now precluded from cancellation relief will hardly put a dent in the estimated
224. See Heyman, supra note 138, at 908-10.
225. AMAN, JR. & MAYTON, supra note 194 § 13.9.1, at 492 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
226. ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTTmTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS
7 (1985) (quoting from Immigration Report, FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, Mar. 1983, at
4).
227. Testimony June 29, 1995, Anthony Moscato, Director of Executive Office for
Immigration Review Department ofJustice, House Judiciary Immigration and Claims Efforts
to Control Illegal Immigration, Federal News Service, Jun. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS,
LEGIS Library, CNGTST File.
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300,000 illegal immigrants entering the United States each year 21 Yet, with any
increase in the number of deportations, politicians can proclaim to their
constituents that they are tough on illegal immigration. 9
By prohibiting judicial review, Congress removed a long-standing check on
arbitrary agency decisionmaking. Critics have noted that "[t]he idea of
immunizing a government agency from being called upon to account in court
goes against what most Americans have thought was the theme of our system:
government under law. To do it for one of the most troubled of all federal
agencies, the INS, is a step so extreme that it is hard to believe .... ."" Indeed,
the administration of cancellation of deportation relief contradicts the oft-quoted
axiom of our democracy that we have "a government of laws and not of men."'"
As a result of the Supreme Court's failure to enforce the nondelegation doctrine
and Congress's prohibition ofjudicial review, injustices are inevitable because
the inescapable reality is that men, not law, govern the process.
The acceptance of Congress's broad delegations has traditionally "rested in
part on the assumption that agency action is subject to meaningful review." '232
Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly-and
courts have upheld such delegation-because there is court review to assure
that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and
that it fleshes out objectives within those limits by an administration that
is not irrational or discriminatory. Nor is that envisioned judicial role
ephemeral .. 233
Congress's prohibition of judicial review removes this basic premise and
therefore leaves the INS effectively uncontrolled and unaccountable for its
actions.
Admittedly, Congress may restrict cancellation of deportation relief, or
eliminate it altogether, should Congress deem it wise to do so. However, upon
deciding to provide humanitarian relief in whatever form, Congress must take
228. See, e.g., Variety of Measures Can Cut Illegal Immigration, USATODAY, Jan. 3, 1996,
at 1 A, available in LEXIS, News Library' USA TODAY File.
229. There were 51,600 illegal visitors deported from the United States in 1995, a rise of
15% over 1994- "a fact trumpeted by the Clinton administration as proof that it [was] serious
about fighting illegal immigration." Id.
230. Anthony Lewis, Coming to America Congress' Cruel Provisions Hurt Immigrants and
Citizens, PHOENIx GAZETTE, Sep. 24, 1996, at B5, available in 1996 WL 7736909.
231. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). The expression derives from
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, pt. I, art. XXX, where it refers to the principle of
separation of powers. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 189 (1992).
233. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring), 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991)
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("[J]udicial review perfects a delegated-lawmaking scheme by
assuring that the exercise of such power remains within statutory bounds."); American Power
& Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (It is "constitutionally sufficient if Congress
clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries
of this delegated authority. Private rights are protected by access to the courts to test the
application of the policy in the light of these legislative declarations.").
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responsibility for the law it created. Only those individuals for whom Congress
contemplated relief be granted should obtain it-no more, no less. Given
Congress's annual limitations on the number of grants of relief, ensuring correct
determinations becomes all the more important. However, Congress has failed
to elucidate what is a correct determination. By not legislating with requisite
specificity, Congress avoids accountability for the law it created and leaves a
politically powerless group to suffer the consequences.
Congress must take a more responsible and humane approach to illegal
immigration reform. A more sensible approach would strive to improve
enforcement of our current laws which focus on interdiction at the border and
interior enforcement, rather than curtailing humanitarian relief. Perhaps we could
proactively reduce hardships through better enforcement of our laws before an
illegal alien has children, establishes ties to the community, and generally
acclimates to life in the United States. Reducing the opportunity for potentially
severe hardships to develop may likewise reduce the need for cancellation of
deportation relief.
Nonetheless, Congress continues to ignore the "root cause of the agency's
spectacular failure to control illegal immigration"-INS mismanagement? 4 A
comprehensive reform of INS procedures, operations, and decisionmaking is
therefore essential. Without theses changes, the agency cannot administer our
immigration laws effectively. In that vein, the following proposals are offered to
improve the agency's administration of cancellation of deportation relief and
thereby restore the provision's humanitarian purpose.
234. Daniel W. Sutherland, The Federal Immigration Bureaucracy: The Achilles Heel of
Immigration Reform, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 109, 109 (1996).
Since the 1930s, over twenty-five commissions and congressional oversight
committees have proposed major reforms in the federal immigration bureaucracy.
In 1981, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy described the
INS as "among the most beleaguered agencies in the federal government." In
1986, the House Judiciary Committee characterized the INS as "under-manned,
ill-equipped, and generally overwhelmed." In 1990, a Congressional commission
concluded that "[r]eorganization of the current structure... is urgently needed."
In 1994, an investigative series in The New York Times concluded that the INS is
"perhaps the most troubled major agency in the federal government," and
"broadly dysfunctional." In March 1995, Congressman Harold Rogers (R-KY)
charged that the INS is "the most inept, badly managed federal agency that we
have." Rogers concluded that the INS "needs [deep reform] more than any agency
I've ever seen." Warren Leiden, Executive Director of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association, laments, "[t]he INS needs elementary strategic
management. It is so lacking, it is overwhelming." Frank Sharry of the National
Immigration Forum says that the INS has "traditionally been one of the most
demoralized and least effective federal bureaucracies-and that's saying a lot."
Id. at 110-11 (footnotes omitted).
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A. INS: A Callfor Managerial Reform
As a result of Congress's inability or unwillingness to provide adequate
guidance through legislation, the primary authority over immigration practices
and procedures is left to the INS. Therefore, absent a reinvigoration of the
nondelegation doctrine, reform must begin with the INS.
The task of improving the quality ofjustice administered by the INS is not so
different from that of other administrative schemes. 5 Jerry Mashaw provides an
excellent examination of the inherent difficulty in administering justice under the
Social Security disability insurance system. 6 Mashaw defines the justice of an
administrative system as "those qualities of a decision process that provide
arguments for the acceptability of its decisions." '237 The dominant approach to
such acceptability is what Mashaw terms "bureaucratic rationality." '238
Given the democratically (legislatively) approved task.., the administrative
goal in the ideal conception of bureaucratic rationality is to develop, at the
least possible cost, a system for distinguishing between true and false claims.
Adjudicating should be both accurate (the legislatively specified goal) and
cost-effective. This approach can be stated more broadly by introducing
235. Indeed, courts have required agency development of standards for a number of benefit
programs. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,231 (1974) (Native American general assistance
benefits).
[A]gency power to make rules that affect substantial individual rights and
obligations carries with it the responsibility not only to remain consistent
with the governing legislation, but also to employ procedures that conform
to the law. No matter how rational or consistent with congressional intent a
particular decision might be, the determination of eligibility cannot be made
on an ad hoc basis ....
Id. at 232 (citations omitted); see also Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631, 637 (8th Cir. 1983)
(farm loan deferral relief) ("[Statute] requires the development of substantive standards at the
agency level to guide the Secretary's discretion in making individual deferral decisions.");
White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1976) (welfare) (Due process requires that
"administrator ... has the responsibility to administer the program to ensure the fair and
consistent application of eligibility requirements. Fair and consistent application of such
requirements requires that [administrator] establish written standards and regulations.");
Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth.,-398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) (public housing)
("[D]ue process requires that selections among applicants be made in accordance with
'ascertainable standards."'); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964) (liquor
license) ("If [court] develops that no ascertainable standards have been established.., by
which an applicant can intelligently seek to qualify for a license, then the court must enjoin the
denial of licenses under the prevailing system and until a legal standard is established and
procedural due process provided. .. ."). Surely, given the enormous stakes involved, these
principles should extend to cancellation of deportation decisionmaking.
236. JERRY L. MASHAW, BuREAucRATIc JUsTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS (1983).
237. Id. at 24-25.
238. See id. at 23-40 (discussing and comparing justice models).
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trade-offs between error, administrative, and other "process" costs such that
the goal becomes "minimize the sum of error and other associated costs." '239
Using the bureaucratic rationality model of justice as a guide, the INS can
effectively improve cancellation of deportation decisionmaking. Under this
model, effective decisionmaking requires at least three things: "an understanding
of the values or goals that are to be pursued; knowledge of the relevant facts; and
an accurate prediction of the connection between a particular decision, given the
factual context, and the accomplishment of one or more of the decisionmaker's
goals."24 Thus, cancellation of deportation decisionmakers must (1) internalize
an appropriate definition of the hardship standards; (2) collect information
sufficient to allow a determination of whether a particular alien's circumstances
meet that definition; and (3) understand the way in which a discretionary grant
or denial of relief furthers the statutory goal.24'
As a first step, the INS must clarify current law. The Attorney General and her
delegates should work to develop an agency-wide working definition of both
hardship standards. In addition, the agency should develop standards for deciding
whether to grant relief when an alien has met the statutory eligibility
requirements. The agency has essentially two options to adopt such standards:
(1) rulemaking and-(2) case-by-case adjudication.
Although the requisite hardships and equities which merit a discretionary grant
of relief are difficult to set forth in a hard and fast rule, the agency should have
by now developed principles which are the basis for its decisions. The INS could
therefore promulgate rules which articulate these principles. Such rules would
provide guidance to immigration judges in their exercise of discretion thus
promoting uniformity and minimizing arbitrary and erroneous decisionmaking.
If the INS believes that standards for cancellation of deportation
decisionmaking are incapable of resolution by general rule, it can develop these
standards on a case-by-case basis as experience develops. That is, the agency
does not have to formulate some abstract generalization, but can establish
standards from answers to recurring issues decisionmakers encounter through
adjudication. However, the BIA has moved far too slow in this regard.242 If the
agency must continue in this fashion, it must at least publish more precedential
decisions to provide meaningful guidance. Still, exclusive reliance on
adjudication inhibits the elaboration of these standards. Therefore, the INS
239. Id at 25; cf Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews established a three part
balancing test for assessing the process due a person which requires consideration of three
factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.
Id. at 335.
240. Id. at 49.
241. See id.
242. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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should adopt rules as soon as practicable to supersede the standards developed
through adjudication.
Previously, the agency may have felt it had no incentive to develop standards
for the administration of cancellation of deportation relief as a reviewing court
could hold the agency accountable to its own standards. As Congress has
eliminated judicial review, the threat ofjudicial oversight is no longer a concern.
However, by adopting decisionmaking standards, individual agency
decisionmakers can conserve valuable time and resources by not having to
constantly reexamine recurring issues. Furthermore, exposing the basis on which
the agency makes its determinations lends credibility to the agency's decisions
and enhances confidence in the fairness of the system.
Development of such standards would not impair flexibility as periodic
changes could be made and ought to be encouraged to continuously improve the
standards. "Greater precisiveness need not completely straitjacket the adjudicator
or limit the range of elements which may properly be considered." 43 The agency
should simply seek to continually articulate relevant factors and implement
adjudicative guidelines to assist in providing fair and impartial decisions.244
Yet, these standards are of little value if not properly communicated
throughout the agency. Currently, immigration decisionmakers have very limited
direction from INS headquarters on interpreting the law.245 Sources to aid
decisionmakers such as the "Examinations Guidebook" and the "Operating
Instructions" are so outdated that they are rarely consulted.246 Furthermore, the
INS has no index of the court decisions interpreting immigration laws.247 "As a
result, the overwhelming majority of decisions have existed in a sort of
netherworld. '248
Managerial reform is necessary to effectuate an agency-wide understanding of
the agency's mission and to communicate to each employee his or her respective
responsibilities.249 Permitting unguided decisionmaking is simply poor
243. Roberts, supra note 120, at 165.
244. In 1979, the INS proposed regulations that sought to establish similar guidelines to
consider in the exercise of discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994) and other provisions of the
statute. However, the project was abandoned. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,187 (1979); 46 Fed. Reg.
9119 (1981); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 9, at 679.
245. Sutherland, supra note 234, at 116.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Beth Holland, Laws Under Scrutiny / Decisions Once Guarded Now Yield to Change,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 30, 1996, at A5, available in LEXIS, News Library, NEWSDAY File.
249. Following the precepts of the Clinton Administration's "reinventing government"
initiative, the INS supposedly initiated "'sweeping organizational reform to address these
longstanding problems and reinvent the agency."' Sutherland, supra note 234, at 132 (quoting
Accepting the Immigration Challenge: The President's Report on Immigration, The White
House, at VII (1994)). Although the Administration did appoint Doris Meissner, "a noted
immigration expert who is polished in dealing with Congress and the media," as INS
Commissioner, the reform effort "has in fact changed very little about the INS, other than
improving its public relations effort." Id. at 115-116, 133. Outside observers have noted that
"the reinventing government initiative has hardly scratched the surface: 'The Service has a
talented management team, on top of a bubble filled with demoralized, poorly trained and badly
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management. The INS, as an agency, must develop the standards for the
administration of cancellation of deportation relief. With the inherent amount of
discretion involved in administering individualized justice, "clear policy
statements become of overriding importance as a guide to action.""25 Thus, the
INS must develop and communicate that policy throughout the bureaucracy.
Individual cancellation of deportation decisionmakers should merely implement
policy, not formulate it on a case-by-case basis according to their own subjective
notions.
In sum, to improve the quality ofjustice it administers, the INS must develop
standards for cancellation of deportation decisionmaking. Further, it must
communicate those standards to individual decisionmakers and maintain control
over the exercise of discretion. With the absence of judicial oversight,
managerial reform within the agency becomes critical. Indeed, the INS alone will
ultimately define justice.
B. Congressional Responsibility
If the Attorney General and her subordinates fail to move swiftly enough to
implement internal reforms, Congress must take responsibility for its law.
Congress should by amendment establish standards for the administration of the
cancellation or removal provision. If Congress is unable, or simply chooses not
to do so, it should require the Attorney General to establish procedures necessary
to effectuate the fair and efficient administration of the provision. In addition,
Congress should provide the INS with necessary resources to provide
decisionmakers with appropriate training and information. Congress should then
maintain oversight over the agency to ensure that the agency acts in accordance
with congressional aims. Without judicial review, these measures are imperative
to prevent potential injustices.
However, Congress should also repeal its ill-considered measure stripping
courts ofjurisdiction. Agency decisionmaking in the shadow ofjudicial review
is apt to be more responsible as it strives to meet the potential objections of a
managed staff."' Id at 132 (quoting from a January 5, 1995 interview with Frank Sharry of the
National Immigration Forum). Thus, improving the quality ofjustice the INS administers will
require much more. As Mashaw explains:
The quality ofjustice provided in such a system depends primarily on how
good the management system is at dealing with the set of conflicting demands that
define rational, fair, and efficient adjudication. It must translate vague and
conflicting statutory goals into administerable rules, without losing the true and
sometimes subtle thrust of the program. It must attempt to ensure that decisions
are consistent and that development is adequate, without impairing the discretion
necessary individualization. It must simplify and objectify the data relevant to
adjudication in order to direct action and to monitor outputs, but without so
distorting perception that decisionmaking is in fact divorced from a reality that is
also complex and subjective. It must deploy appropriate expertise while screening
out inappropriate professional bias. It must balance perceptible administrative
costs against the less perceptible cost of error....
MASHAW, supra note 236, at 172.
250. Roberts, supra note 120, at 165.
1997]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
reviewing court. Furthermore, if the agency does its job, judicial review should
be of no concern. A reviewing court merely ensures that the agency plays by its
own rules.
Judicial review is also designed to reach beyond the immediate parties through
a public dialogue between the courts and the agency to help further the law. This
dialogue helps to fill in the details, draw the subtle distinctions, and ultimately
get closer to the elusive discretionary standards. Without agency development
and articulation of the agency's decisionmaking criteria, judicial review remains
an essential tool to promote understanding and awareness of the general bases for
relief.
Despite the implementation of such reforms, very few aliens will meet the
restrictive eligibility requirements of INA section 240A.25 Congress must
reevaluate the balance it struck between enforcement concerns and the
humanitarian purpose behind cancellation of deportation relief. The potentially
severe hardships imposed on these relatively few aliens appear grossly
disproportionate to the insignificant effects of their deportation on illegal
immigration.
CONCLUSION
Congress originally enacted cancellation of deportation relief to ameliorate the
harsh effects of deportation on long-term resident aliens. However, under the
pretense of getting tough on illegal immigration, the IIRIRA renders this relief
illusory. The newly-constructed "cancellation of removal" provision's highly
restrictive eligibility requirements remove availability to most aliens thereby
imposing extreme hardship on many aliens, as well as their families, friends, and
communities. For those aliens who can overcome these seemingly
insurmountable hurdles, relief is further circumscribed by the unfettered
discretion vested in INS decisionmakers-exacerbated by Congress's prohibition
of judicial review. The INS, and ultimately Congress, should move swiftly to
correct these ill-advised and irresponsible developments in the law. We should
not leave the final word to "one of the least effective and most ridiculed
bureaucracies in the nation's history" '252 to unjustly deprive anyone "of all that
makes life worth living.2 53
251. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) 1570,
1644-48 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b).
252. Sutherland, supra note 234, at 110.
253. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
Vol. 72:885
